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REVISITING THE LEGAL STANDARDS THAT
GOVERN REQUESTS TO STERILIZE
PROFOUNDLY INCOMPETENT CHILDREN:
IN LIGHT OF THE "ASHLEY TREATMENT," IS A
NEW STANDARD APPROPRIATE?
Christine Ryan*
This Note discusses the recent controversy surrounding a six-year-old
girl named Ashley, whose parents chose to purposefully stunt her growth
and remove her reproductive organs for nonmedical reasons. A federal
investigation determined that Ashley's rights had been violated because
doctors performed the procedure, now referred to as the "Ashley
Treatment," without first obtaining a court order. However, the
investigation did not make any conclusions regarding whether the "Ashley
Treatment" could present a legally permissible treatment option in the
future. After discussing the constitutional rights that the "Ashley
Treatment" implicates and the current legal standards in place, this Note
examines how courts have applied these legal standards to cases involving
extreme requests. Drawing upon legal commentators, this Note concludes
that a court could approve a request for the "Ashley Treatment" in
appropriate and limited cases where the parents have presented clear and
convincing evidence before a court that the benefits that the "Ashley
Treatment" would provide to the child and her family outweigh the risks
associated with the procedure. This Note argues that those benefits may
include extrinsic considerations, but courts should remain cautious when
considering such evidence and be sure that the evidence as a whole
supports their conclusions.
INTRODUCTION
The most humane way you can treat somebody is to treat them
appropriately for what their needs are and what their context is. You
don't treat everybody identically. You treat them as a person, which
means they are different from the person sitting next to them.
What treating Ashley humanely means is recognizing what her world
is and will be for a long time is her loving family, her parents. That is
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
parents for their constant love and support and for always encouraging me to achieve my
goals.
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
where she gets her love. That is where she gets her care. It's a small
world. And what these parents requested are three things they feel will
make her life better in that small world. I think that's treating her
humanely. I
In an interview with Larry King on January 12, 2007, Dr. Douglas S.
Diekema defended his involvement in an ethical and moral debate
surrounding a nine-year-old girl from Seattle, known only as Ashley. The
controversy arose in October 2006 after Dr. Diekema and his colleague, Dr.
Daniel F. Gunther, published an article called Attenuating Growth in
Children with Profound Developmental Disability.2 The article advocated
growth attenuation and hysterectomy for a profoundly incompetent 3 and
nonambulatory six-year-old girl, 4 later identified by her parents as Ashley. 5
The stated purpose of the treatment plan was to improve Ashley's quality of
life and to help her parents prolong home care. 6 Immediately following the
publication of the article in October 2006, members of the medical and
disability communities reacted strongly to Diekema and Gunther's
proposal. 7 The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities8 publicly condemned Gunther and Diekema for suggesting that
growth attenuation therapy could justifiably be performed on children with
1. Telephone Interview by Larry King with Dr. Douglas S. Diekema, Dir. of Educ.,
Truman Katz Ctr. for Pediatric Bioethics at Seattle Children's Hosp., in Seattle, Wash. (Jan.
12, 2007).
2. Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with
Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, 160 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 1013 (2006).
3. This Note focuses on "profoundly incompetent" children, which are those children
that possess the lowest possible level of competency. Typically, profoundly incompetent
individuals are described as having an I.Q. below twenty. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985); see also Norman L. Cantor, The Bane of
Surrogate Decision-Making: Defining the Best Interests of Never-Competent Persons, 26 J.
LEGAL MED. 155, 158 (2005) ("Profoundly disabled persons, by definition, have never had
the capacity for autonomy. They have never had the ability to issue instructions ... or to
form values and preferences that would guide surrogate decision-makers."). Other levels of
competency, as measured by I.Q., that are outside the scope of this Note are mild (50-55 to
70), moderate (35-40 to 50-55), and severe (20-25 to 35-40). AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 49 (4th ed., rev. 2000).
4. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2, at 1014.
5. The "Ashley Treatment," http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/blog (Jan. 2, 2007).
6. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2, at 1014.
7. See, e.g., Ethan B. Ellis, Disabling Children With Disabilities, 161 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 419, 419 (2007) ("[Ilntense anger... was my first reaction
and the universal reaction of my colleagues in the disability movement."); see also Hank
Bersani, Growth Attenuation: Unjustifiable Non-Therapy, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC
ADOLESCENT MED. 520 (2007); Carole L. Marcus, Only Half the Story, 161 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 616 (2007). For a summary of the specific critiques of several
disability organizations, see Kristi L. Kirschner et al., Ashley X, 86 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. &
REHABILITATION 1023, 1027, 1029 & nn.28-31 (2007).
8. The mission of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities is to "promote[] progressive policies, sound research, effective practices and
universal human rights for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities." Am.
Ass'n on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Mission Statement,
http://www.aaidd.org/AboutAAIDD/missionstatement.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
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mental disabilities.9 However, many of the reactions from the public were
fueled by emotion, rather than fact.' 0 Ashley's parents, dissatisfied with the
way the media had portrayed their family's story, decided to come forward
to respond. They launched a blog on January 2, 2007, in order to correct
misconceptions surrounding the treatment plan and their motives, as well as
to help similarly situated families obtain more information about the
treatment.11 The blog provoked considerable response from the public;
Ashley's parents received more than three thousand e-mail messages in ten
days. 12 Despite the initial number of critics of the "Ashley Treatment," an
overwhelming majority of the people who visited the blog was supportive
of Ashley's parents' choice.' 3
Nonetheless, the story continued to recruit critics. 14  Activists from
Feminist Response in Disability Activism demanded that the American
Medical Association publicly renounce the procedure 15 and called for state
9. Am. Ass'n on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Board Position Statement:
Growth Attenuation Issue, http://www.aamr.org/Policies/growth.shtml (last visited Sept. 20,
2008).
10. See Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Disabling Children with
Disabilities-In Reply, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 419, 420 (2007)
(commenting that the "initial visceral reaction is often fueled, at least in part, by some
misunderstandings and a failure to appreciate some important distinctions we set out in our
article").
11. The "Ashley Treatment," http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/blog (Jan. 9, 2007)
("Upon reviewing some press and TV coverage, we wish the media would be more careful in
reading our story and more precise in interpreting and reporting it. We've seen many
instances of sensationalist spin and misinterpretation."). For an example of a misperception
that circulated, see Benjamin S. Wilfond, The Ashley Case: The Public Response and Policy
Implications, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 12, 12, which describes how some
discussions had associated the growth attenuation therapy performed on Ashley with
hypodermic needles and bone fusion, creating the misleading idea that she had been
"frozen."
12. When asked on January 12, 2007, about the public's response to their blog, Ashley's
parents responded: "We have received 3,600 plus private messages. They continue to flow
at the rate of 200 a day." Telephone Interview by Larry King with Dr. Douglas Diekema,
supra note 1. As of December 31, 2007, Ashley's parents had received a total of 4705 e-
mail messages. The "Ashley Treatment," http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/blog (Dec.
31, 2007).
13. Telephone Interview by Larry King with Dr. Douglas Diekema, supra note 1. As of
December 31, 2007, of the 3903 e-mail messages received that took a position on the
"Ashley Treatment," 93.9% supported the "Ashley Treatment" (3665), while only 6.1%
disapproved (238). The "Ashley Treatment," http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/blog
(Dec. 31, 2007).
14. Gerald D. Coleman, The Irreversible Disabling of a Child: The "Ashley
Treatment, " 7 NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICS CENTER 711, 718-20 (2007); see also Alicia R.
Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children:
Lessons from the Ashley X Case 11-15 (Jan. 1, 2008) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract - 1084903.
15. Coleman, supra note 14, at 719. After meeting with several activists about its
apparent endorsement of the "Ashley Treatment," the American Medical Association
(AMA) clarified its position to Feminist Response in Disability Activism on March 5, 2007:
"The AMA currently has no official policy on the treatments outlined in [Dr. Gunther and
Dr. Diekema's] article." Feminist Response in Disability Activism, http://fridanow.
blogspot.com/2007/03/yes-we-got-letter-from-dr.html (Mar. 19, 2007, 08:06 EST).
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and federal officials to investigate whether Ashley's rights had been
violated. The Washington Protection and Advocacy System (WPAS), 16 a
federally mandated watchdog organization, commenced an investigation on
January 6, 2007, to determine precisely what had happened to Ashley. 17
The WPAS published its findings in an investigative report that presented a
compilation of the details of Ashley's condition and her parents' decision to
proceed with surgical intervention. 18 The remainder of this Introduction
describes Ashley's story leading up to the publication of the investigative
report, and her situation currently.
Shortly after birth, Ashley began demonstrating physical and mental
signs of abnormal cognitive development. 19 Doctors performed several
tests and determined that Ashley's brain had stopped developing, leaving
her with the mental capacity of a six-month-old baby.20 Ashley's I.Q. is so
low that it is untestable, 21 classifying her as profoundly disabled.22 Doctors
eventually diagnosed Ashley's condition as static encephalopathy of
unknown origin.23 In lay terms, static encephalopathy means brain damage
that is unlikely to improve over time.24 In Ashley's case, the likelihood that
her condition will improve is virtually nonexistent.25
As a result of her disease, Ashley is completely dependent on others.2 6
She is incapable of sitting up on her own, holding her head up, or changing
16. Washington Protection and Advocacy System, http://www.wpas-
rights.org/index.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). As of June 1, 2007, the Washington
Protection and Advocacy System (WPAS) changed its name to Disability Rights
Washington. See Disability Rights Washington, http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/ (last
visited Aug. 27, 2008).
17. DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN, WASH. PROT. & ADVOCACY SYS.,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING THE "ASHLEY TREATMENT," (2007) [hereinafter WPAS
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT], available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news-I/
Investigative%20Report%20Regarding%20the%20Ashley%20Treatment.pdf. WPAS has
federal authority pursuant to the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15041 (2000), the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals
Act, Id. § 10801, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794(e) (2000). WPAS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra, at 5.
18. See generally WPAS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 17.
19. See Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2, at 1014 (indicating that Ashley displayed
symptoms of diminished muscle tone, feeding difficulty, involuntary bodily movements, and
developmental delay).
20. WPAS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 17, at 11 n.32.
21. Letter from Larry A. Jones, Law Offices of Larry A. Jones, to Ashley's Dad 2 (June
10, 2004), available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news-1/Investigative%20Report/
20Regarding%20the%2OAshley%2OTreatment-Exhibits%20%20-%20T.pdf (appended to
WPAS's investigative report as Exhibit 0).
22. See supra note 3.
23. See Ashley's Mom and Dad, The "Ashley Treatment," Towards a Better Quality of
Life for "Pillow Angels"© 1 [hereinafter Pillow Angels], available at http://pillowangel.org/
Ashley%20Treatment%20v7.pdf.
24. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000) (defining encephalopathy as
any disorder of the brain).
25. See Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2, at 1014.
26. Pillow Angels, supra note 23, at 1.
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her sleeping position.27 Ashley cannot use language, and she is fed through
a gastrostomy tube.28  She cannot hold a toy on her own. 29  She rarely
makes eye contact, and her parents are not even sure if she recognizes
them.30
Nonetheless, Ashley is conscious and interactive. She is able to move
her arms and kick her legs. 31 She displays no physical deformities. 32 She
will often "smile[] and express[] delight" when others are around, or when
music is playing. 33 During the week, she attends school with other special-
needs children, where she participates in daily activities and bus trips. 34
In early 2004, at age six, Ashley manifested signs of precocious
adolescence and accelerated growth. 35 Her parents became concerned that
continued home care would not be feasible. 36 Ashley's parents took their
concerns to Doctors Gunther and Diekema at Seattle Children's Hospital.
Together, they developed a novel medical procedure that came to be known
as the "Ashley Treatment."'37
The decision to proceed with this novel treatment was not automatic.
Ashley's parents first presented the proposal in May 2004 to Seattle
Children's Hospital's forty-person ethics committee. 38 The committee
evaluated Ashley's medical condition, her parent's motivation for seeking
the intervention, and whether the procedure would improve her quality of
27. Id.
28. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2, at 1014.
29. Pillow Angels, supra note 23, at 1.
30. Id. at 1, 3.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id. at 1-2.
33. Id. at 1, 3. According to her parents, Ashley's favorite musician is Andrea Bocelli.
Id. at 1.
34. Id.
35. See Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2, at 1014 (indicating that Ashley moved from
the 50th percentile to the 75th percentile for length in under six months).
36. Id.
37. The "Ashley Treatment," http://ashleytreatment.spaces.live.com/blog (January 12,
2007, 07:56 EST) ("The Ashley Treatment is the name we have given to a collection of
medical procedures for the improvement of Ashley's quality of life."); see infra text
accompanying notes 51-58 (providing a complete description of the procedure); see also
The "Ashley Treatment" for the wellbeing of "Pillow Angels,"
http://pillowangel.org/AT%20Summary.jpg (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (offering a pictorial
summary of the treatment and its benefits). Also of note, Dr. Douglas Diekema had already
considered the problem that families like Ashley's face. Less than one year before Ashley's
parents visited Seattle Children's Hospital, Dr. Diekema published an article that suggested a
new way to view surrogate decision making in the sterilization context. Ironically, many of
the factors in his article that he insisted were necessary were not present in Ashley's case.
See Douglas S. Diekema, Involuntary Sterilization of Persons with Mental Retardation: An
Ethical Analysis, 9 MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REV. 21,
25 (2003) (insisting that sterilization be performed only when it was "urgently necessary,"
and never before pubescence).
38. See ETHICS COMM., CHILDREN'S HOSP. & REG'L MED. CTR., SPECIAL CHRMC
ETHICS COMMITTEE MEETING/CONSULTATION (May 5, 2004) [hereinafter CHRMC ETHICS
COMMITTEE], available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news- I/Investigative%2OReport
%20Regarding%20the%2OAshley%20TreatmentExhibits%20K%20-%20T.pdf (appended
to WPAS's investigative report as Exhibit L).
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life.39 The committee performed a balancing test to determine whether the
prospective benefits outweighed potential harms and risks,4 0 In sum, the
risks of the procedure included increased likelihood of deep vein
thrombosis, possible weight gain and nausea, and surgical risks and
recovery discomfort.41 The benefits of the procedures were facilitating
home care, improving Ashley's quality of life and comfort, and avoiding
the physical, emotional, and hygienic problems associated with
menstruation.42 The committee unanimously concluded that the "Ashley
Treatment" was appropriate under the circumstances. 43 Nonetheless, the
committee advised the parents to seek legal advice so they could satisfy the
legal standards governing sterilization required under Washington state
law.44
Ashley's parents took the committee's advice and sought the legal
services of Larry A. Jones, a Seattle lawyer familiar with disability law.45
In June 2004, after reviewing applicable case law, Jones advised Ashley's
parents that the treatment could go forward without a court order.4 6 He
distinguished prior case law as inapplicable to Ashley's case and ultimately
concluded that Washington state law "must be read to allow sterilization
when it is merely a byproduct of surgery performed for other compelling
medical reasons." 47 He based this conclusion on the severity of Ashley's
incompetence and the permanence of her condition.48 Jones concluded that
the procedures would make permanent home care an attainable reality for
Ashley and her parents, which was a "medically necessary benefit" that was
"compelling. '4 9 Doctors performed the "Ashley Treatment" on Ashley one
month later in July 2004.50
The "Ashley Treatment" is a combination of three medical procedures
having the stated purpose of improving the quality of life and well-being of
a profoundly incompetent child.51 First, doctors administered high doses of
estrogen to reduce Ashley's final height and overall weight.52 The principal
39. Id.
40. See id. at 2-3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 3; see also Telephone Interview by Larry King with Dr. Douglas Diekema,
supra note 1 ("I can tell you that there was no one in the room who disagreed with the
decision.").
44. See CHRMC ETHICS COMMITTEE, supra note 38, at 3.
45. See Law Offices of Larry A. Jones, http://www.seattledisabilitylaw.com/welcome.
html (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (describing Larry A. Jones's background and experience
with disability cases).
46. Letter from Larry A. Jones to Ashley's Dad, supra note 21, at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2-4.
49. Id. at 1, 4.
50. Pillow Angels, supra note 23, at 6.
51. See id. at 4-5.
52. See id. at 6 (estimating that treatment, which took two and a half years to complete,
will reduce Ashley's projected height by 20%, and projected weight by 40%). On December
31, 2007, Ashley's parents provided an update: "Ashley today weighs 63 pounds and is 53
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benefit of attenuating growth was to permit others to move Ashley more
easily, consequently increasing her participation in family activities.
53
Ashley's parents were also motivated by their desire to continue caring for
her in their home. 54 Second, doctors removed Ashley's breast buds to
prevent breast development. 55  This was intended to reduce Ashley's
discomfort when recumbent or fastened into her wheel chair.56 The breast
bud removal was preventative in nature as well. According to Ashley's
parents, reducing breast size would avert breast cancer and fibrocystic
growths-which both ran in Ashley's family-and would prevent the
possibility that Ashley's breasts would sexualize her to a caregiver.
5 7
Lastly, doctors removed Ashley's uterus to prevent menstruation and the
physical discomfort menstruation would cause her.58
After reviewing state law that focused on the sterilization of incompetent
children, the WPAS investigative report concluded that performing the
"Ashley Treatment" without a court order violated Ashley's constitutional
due process rights, common-law rights, and Washington state law. 59 The
WPAS developed several corrective actions for the hospital to implement to
prevent performing any procedure involving sterilization on a minor
without first obtaining a court order.60 Despite its harsh critique of the
hospital's protocol, the WPAS investigative report issued no opinion on
how the court would have ruled on the "Ashley Treatment" in Ashley's
specific case or whether any state court will ever authorize a similar
procedure in the future. 61
This Note will examine whether the current legal standards governing
surrogate decision making for the profoundly disabled are adequate to
inches (4' 5") tall, unchanged from a year ago ...." The "Ashley Treatment," http://ashley
treatment.spaces.live.com/blog (Dec. 31, 2007).
53. Pillow Angels, supra note 23, at 7 ("The main benefit of the height and weight
reduction is that Ashley can be moved considerably more often, which is extremely
beneficial to her health and well being .... As a result, Ashley can continue to delight in
being held in our arms and will be moved and taken on trips more frequently and will have
more exposure to activities and social gatherings ... instead of lying down in her bed staring
at TV (or the ceiling) all day long.").
54. See id.
55. See id. at 9 (stressing that performing the breast bud procedure in a young girl is
simpler than performing a mastectomy on an adult woman with fully formed breasts). But
see Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2 (omitting discussion of the removal of breast buds).
56. See Pillow Angels, supra note 23, at 9.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 8 (asserting incidental benefits of removing Ashley's uterus included a
reduced possibility of pregnancy and uterine cancer). But see WPAS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 11-12 (suggesting that the prevention of pregnancy appears to be one of
the main purposes, rather than merely an additional benefit).
59. WPAS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 17, at 1, 27.
60. See id. at 2-4.
61. Id. at 28. According to Georgia State University law professor Paul Lombardo,
Washington state law presents one of the highest burdens for petitioners seeking
sterilization. See Removal of Girl's Uterus in 'Ashley Treatment' Breaks State Law,
WIRED.COM, May 8, 2007, http://www.wired.com/medtech/health/news/2007/05/ashley_
legal#corrections.
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address whether parents or guardians may request that the "Ashley
Treatment" be performed on their child. Currently, questions of surrogate
decision making are analyzed using some form of a substituted judgment
analysis 62 or a best interests test.63  As this Note demonstrates, the
application of these standards changes depending on the particular facts of a
case and the evidence available.64 Courts employ the substituted judgment
analysis when the person articulated a clear preference while previously
competent. 65 Courts use the best interests test when the person did not
articulate a clear preference or has been incompetent since birth.66 This
Note argues that, because the "Ashley Treatment" infringes on both
fundamental rights and interests, parents requesting this treatment must
present clear and convincing evidence that justifies the infringement.
Courts may assess a number of considerations, not merely medical in
nature. This Note asserts that extrinsic considerations, such as
psychological welfare, emotional effect, social benefit, and effect on the
familial structure are all important considerations. This Note argues that, if
the parents present evidence that the infringement of fundamental rights is
clearly outweighed by the benefit of the treatment, then the "Ashley
Treatment" may provide a legally permissible treatment option in such a
limited circumstance.
Part I discusses the constitutional rights that the "Ashley Treatment"
implicates and the legal standards courts have applied in situations where
parents or guardians request sterilization for their profoundly incompetent
child. Part II describes how courts have applied these standards
unpredictably based on the facts, creating confusing jurisprudence. Part
III.A first evaluates the case law described in Part II and takes the position
that a strict application of the legal standards is not helpful as applied to the
"Ashley Treatment." Part III.B proposes that courts examine the "Ashley
Treatment" in light of several considerations, such as medical, social,
psychological, and familial benefit. This Note concludes by describing how
this approach will permit courts to approve of the "Ashley Treatment" in
appropriate and limited situations.
I. THE CONSTITUTION, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND THE PROTECTION OF
THOSE RIGHTS THROUGH APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARDS
Part I discusses the current constitutional and legal framework to which
the "Ashley Treatment" must conform. The U.S. Constitution enumerates
explicit rights belonging to the people. 67 The U.S. Supreme Court has also
recognized additional rights that the founding fathers did not explicitly
62. See infra Part I.B. 1.
63. See infra Part I.B.2.
64. See generally infra Part II.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 138-50.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 156-85.
67. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV, VI, VII.
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articulate, but that the Bill of Rights nonetheless protects. 68 As these
individual rights became more apparent, courts began to invalidate state
intervention that infringed on these fundamental rights. 69 Individual rights,
the Supreme Court declared, must be protected against abuses of power that
threaten to terminate or truncate those rights. 70
The "Ashley Treatment" implicates two important categories of
individual rights: (1) the profoundly incompetent child's rights, and (2) his
or her parents' right to control and direct their child's upbringing. Part I.A
describes and outlines the rights of these two classes of individuals as the
Constitution protects them today. Part I.B then describes the legal
standards that courts have developed to ensure a delicate balance between
the protection of the child's rights and the infringement upon her parents'
rights within the context of sterilization.
A. Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights
This section describes the constitutional rights of parents and children
within the context of sterilization requests. Part I.A. 1 introduces two
conflicting definitions of personhood. Parts I.A.2 and I.A.3 indicate how
the Court has provided incompetent children with the same rights as
competent children, specifically the right to be left alone and the right to
procreate. Finally, Part I.A.4 describes how parents are limited in their
ability to infringe upon these protected constitutional rights but nonetheless
retain some ability to control their children's upbringing.
1. The Rights of Profoundly Incompetent Children
The Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. '7 1 Who qualifies as a
"person" has generated much debate, especially in the context of the
68. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 486 (1965) (respecting marital
privacy); see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a ban on
homosexual sodomy was an unconstitutional infringement of the right of sexual liberty);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (protecting the right of minors to
obtain contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (recognizing the right to
obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (respecting the private choices
of unmarried couples); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (classifying the right to
marry as a "fundamental" right).
69. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46
(2000); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 442 (1983);
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (invalidating a statute authorizing the sterilization of criminals because it denied them
the constitutionally protected rights of procreation and marriage); Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
70. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992) ("The
Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse
of governmental power .... ").
71. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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profoundly disabled.72 Persons are entitled to full moral rights and legal
status, while nonpersons are not.73
Depending on the definition of personhood, some profoundly
incompetent individuals may not exhibit the necessary characteristics.
Under one view, the status of profoundly disabled individuals is uncertain
because this definition of personhood requires a minimum level of
intellectual functioning. 74 Intellectual functioning requires both internal
thinking and external action. 75 This may include the ability to make life
plans, communicate, form human relationships, comprehend moral
principles, recognize one's personal identity over time, or perceive one's
experiences over time. 76 Some profoundly incompetent individuals, such as
those in permanent comas, likely will be excluded under this definition of
personhood.
A more inclusive definition of personhood encompasses profoundly
incompetent individuals. 77 Society and the Supreme Court have recognized
that moral status is applicable to all live human beings. 78 The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides that
all disabled children have the same rights as nondisabled children. 79 Under
this view, constitutional protections attach as soon as a person is born.80
This definition recognizes consciousness as the minimum requirement of
personhood. 81  As such, this view may exclude those individuals-
incompetent or not-who are in a permanent vegetative state or coma.82
2. The Right to Be Left Alone
The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
72. See NORMAN L. CANTOR, MAKING MEDICAL DECISIONS FOR THE PROFOUNDLY
MENTALLY DISABLED 17-19 (Glenn McGee & Arthur Caplan eds., 2005).
73. Id. at 13, 20.
74. Id. at 17-18.
75. MARY ANNE WARREN, MORAL STATUS: OBLIGATIONS TO PERSONS AND OTHER
LIVING THINGS 90-95 (1997); see MICHAEL FREEDEN, RIGHTS 58-59 (Frank Parkin ed.,
1991).
76. CANTOR, supra note 72, at 17-18.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973) ("[T]he word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."); CANTOR, supra note 72, at 20
(describing society's view).
79. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 7, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/
conventionfull.shtml#top.
80. Roe,410 U.S. at 158.
81. See John A. Robertson, Assessing Quality of Life: A Response to Professor
Kamisar, 25 GA. L. REV. 1243, 1247 n. 10 (1991). But see Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and
Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 49 (1994) ("Human beings who lack
or have lost the capacity for autonomous actions are nonetheless humans who retain their
inherent dignity.").
82. Robertson, supra note 81, at 1247.
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seizures, shall not be violated .. -83 In Poe v. Ullman, Justice John
Marshall Harlan in dissent interpreted this amendment liberally, extending
this protection to guard "the privacy of the home against all unreasonable
intrusion of whatever character. '84 This included protecting nonmaterial
considerations, such as emotions, beliefs, and sensations:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is
much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 85
The individual right to privacy and bodily integrity has limits, and must
be weighed against the interests of society. In Breithaupt v. Abram, the
Supreme Court held that the results of a blood test were admissible to prove
intoxication, despite having been procured involuntarily while the accused
was unconscious. 86 The interests of society in assessing intoxication, "one
of the great causes of the mortal hazards of the road," weighed in favor of
admitting the evidence because the bodily intrusion was slight.87
The interests of society have limits as well. No state may justify an
invasive medical procedure to assist third parties when it is against the
wishes of the individual. 88  To do so would violate the Fourth
Amendment 89 as well as the Due Process Clause. 90
3. The Right to Procreate
In 1942, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to procreate is a
fundamental right.9 1 While the Constitution does not explicitly enumerate
the right to procreate, this right draws strength from several Bill of Rights
83. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
84. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original).
86. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1957).
87. Id. at 439.
88. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 n.13 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
89. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
772 (1966); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
90. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, [and]
the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents . . . is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities." (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952))).
91. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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amendments 92 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 93 and
Due Process 94 Clauses, and the case law that has developed reflects this.95
These protections are guaranteed to all individuals, regardless of marital
status,96 and the courts have taken tremendous strides to ensure equal
protection. For example, a child has the right to make autonomous
reproductive decisions-such as, to seek an abortion-even if her parents
object. 97 The Supreme Court overturned a state sterilization statute because
it unconstitutionally required third-time criminal offenders to submit to
compulsory sterilization. 98 Despite these advances, courts have struggled to
apply the law evenhandedly to members of the mentally disabled
community.99 For the mentally incompetent, the right to procreate is often
regarded as a fundamental, but dubious and uncertain right.100
The law today is uncertain partly due to the Supreme Court's failure to
overturn the infamous case of Buck v. Bell. 01 Carrie Buck was an
eighteen-year-old mentally incompetent girl challenging the validity of a
Virginia statute that permitted "the sterilization of mental defectives."' 10 2
The opinion indicated that both Carrie's mother and Carrie's illegitimate
child were mentally incompetent.1 03 The rationale behind the statute was to
promote "the welfare of society" by preventing incompetent individuals
from passing on their genetic impairments to future generations, creating a
strain on society, who would then be entrusted with the care of the
offspring.104 In the end, an 8-1 majority upheld the statute. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes announced the opinion of the Court, and justified the
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965).
93. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538.
94. See id. at 545 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
95. For an expansive recitation of the case law, see Sarah L. Dunn, Note, The "Art" of
Procreation: Why Assisted Reproduction Technology Allows for the Preservation of Female
Prisoners'Right o Procreate, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2561, 2565-71 (2002).
96. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
97. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979) (asserting that a child's constitutional
right to an abortion dwarfs notions of parental authority and autonomy); see also Elizabeth
S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family
Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 834 n.96 (listing Supreme Court examples). But see Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (cautioning that the child's
right to effectively consent to an abortion is not absolute).
98. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538, 541 (overturning the statute for equal protection
reasons).
99. See MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 80 (1999).
100. See NAT'L INST. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, STERILIZATION AND MENTAL HANDICAP:
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MENTAL
RETARDATION AND THE ONTARIO ASSOCIATION FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 89 (1980)
[hereinafter STERILIZATION AND MENTAL HANDICAP].
101. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
102. Id. at 205.
103. Id. But see Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on
Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 61 (1985) (indicating that Carrie's daughter was not
mentally incompetent).
104. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205-06.
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result by infamously proclaiming, "Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."105
Despite its seeming acceptance of government-sponsored eugenics, Buck
remains good law today. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court in Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson overturned a statute permitting the
involuntary sterilization of "habitual criminals," but the Court declined to
overturn Buck, and opted to distinguish it instead. 10 6 In Roe v. Wade, the
Court used Buck as support for the proposition that the right to privacy is
not unlimited. 107 Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that Buck promotes
harsh and extreme measures, and that no state has continued to require such
a level after 1990.108 The legal standards governing the sterilization of
incompetent individuals remains haunted by Buck's sanction of eugenics,
and this legacy inevitably affects judges considering petitions involving
sterilization. 109
4. The Parental Right to Raise Children
The Constitution protects parents' right to raise children.I10 In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court recognized that parents have the right
to nurture and guide their children's upbringing in the context of
education."' Twenty years later in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court
explicitly recognized that "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents."' 112
The right of parents to decide for their children is not inviolate. 113 "In
our society, parental rights are limited by the legitimate rights and interests
of their children." 1 14 Parents do not have free reign to neglect or abuse
their child, alienate his or her property, withhold essential medical
treatment, or deny their child the opportunity to encounter new ideas and
experiences.11 5 Any medical decision involving sterilization will conflict
105. Id. at 207.
106. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942).
107. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
108. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 n.6 (2001).
109. See FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 99, at 78 ("[C]ourt decisions allowing sterilization
sometimes rely on eugenic concerns (such as the need to prevent the birth of 'defective'
offspring) as a supporting reason. Many courts believe it would be unconstitutional to
sterilize as a punishment for crime, but nonetheless hold the state has a valid interest in
sterilizing those thought to have retardation." (citing In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d
307 (N.C. 1976))).
110. E.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected."); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, (1923) (interpreting the Due
Process Clause broadly to protect an individual's right to raise children).
111. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
112. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
113. Id. at 166 &nn.9-11.
114. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 630 (1979).
115. Id. at 630-31 & nn.16-19 (citing case law supporting the protection of children's
rights).
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with the fundamental right to procreate and control one's own
reproduction. 116 When a child is mentally incompetent, her incapacity may
prevent her from making some informed and autonomous decisions, yet
allow decision making in other areas.1 17 When a child is so profoundly
incompetent that she is entirely incapable of making decisions and wholly
reliant on her parents, courts may step in to restrict the parents' ability to
affect their child's reproductive rights. 118
B. Legal Standards Governing Cases Involving the Sterilization of
Profoundly Incompetent Children
Courts have used two primary legal standards when assessing a petition
to sterilize an incompetent child: the "substituted judgment" standard and
the "best interests" test. 119 These standards are used to police different
kinds of surrogate decision making. To accommodate the many factual
situations that may present themselves, these standards must be flexible. As
Part II illuminates, courts may give greater weight to different
considerations depending on the facts of an individual case. 120 But first,
parts I.B. 1 and I.B.2 describe the standards in their unaltered and purest
states.
1. The Substituted Judgment Analysis: Whose Judgment Are We
Substituting?
Courts applying the substituted judgment standard do not substitute the
judgment of a competent person for that of an incompetent person. 121 To
do so would deny the incompetent person of the fundamental right to
116. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (calling the right to procreate a
basic liberty that would be forever deprived from an individual who undergoes unwanted
sterilization).
117. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 2 (describing how mentally disabled individuals may
be excluded from decisions involving high cognitive ability, but are still capable of
exercising a definite preference in other areas).
118. See Scott, supra note 97, at 857 (describing how courts traditionally have rejected
the parents' suggestions for medical treatment if those suggestions conflict with an important
interest of the child).
119. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICINAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT
DECISIONS 132 (1983) [hereinafter THE COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.
bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/deciding-to-forego tx.pdf; CANTOR, supra note 72,
at 41-42. This Note focuses on judicially created legal standards, but a similar inquiry
outside the focus of this Note is how the "Ashley Treatment" fits within the framework of
states that have sterilization statutes. Today, eighteen states have enabling statutes that
expressly authorize a court to order the sterilization of a person with mental disabilities. For
a list of the state statutes, see 49 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 101 n.52 (1998).
120. See generally infra Part II.
121. See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) ("[N]o
person or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of
life for another." (citing People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296 (N.Y. 1984))).
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control one's destiny. 122 Rather, substituted judgment "is intended to
ensure that the surrogate decision maker effectuates as much as possible the
decision that the incompetent patient would make if he or she were
competent." 23
Substituted judgment originated in England in the case Ex parte
Whitbread.124 Whitbread involved an incompetent man, Hinde, and his
mercenary family. 125 Because Hinde was a "lunatic," the court periodically
convened to hear requests on how best to manage his estate. 126 Seizing the
opportunity, Hinde's niece requested that the court increase her portion of
the estate's distribution.12 7 Lord Eldon granted her petition, reasoning that
this is what Hinde would have wanted had he been competent:
[L]ooking at what it is likely the Lunatic himself would do, if he were in a
capacity to act, . . . it would naturally be more agreeable to the lunatic,
and more for his advantage, that they should receive an education and
maintenance suitable to his condition, than that they should be sent into
the world to disgrace him as beggars. 128
Thus, Lord Eldon applied the doctrine of substituted judgment in that he
effected the outcome that Hinde would have desired had he been
competent. 129
Despite its unfortunate origin, American courts regularly apply the
doctrine of substituted judgment to cases involving a petition to make
medical decisions on behalf of an incompetent person.130 According to the
122. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 744-45 (1997) (citing Fitzgerald v.
Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)).
123. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987).
124. (1816) 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.).
125. See id. at 879 ("For a long series of years the Court has been in the habit, in
questions relating to the property of a Lunatic, to call in the assistance of those who are
nearest in blood .... It has, however, become too much the practice that, instead of such
persons confining themselves to the duty of assisting the Court with [the Lunatic's] advice
and management, there is a constant struggle among them to reduce the amount of the
allowance made for the Lunatic, and thereby enlarge the fund which, it is probable, may one
day devolve upon themselves.").
126. Id.; see also Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine
of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 18 n.101 (1990) (describing the court's "power of
administration" over the management of an incompetent individual's estate).
127. See Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878; see also Harmon, supra note 126, at 19-20
("While the [Whitbread] decision did not mention the amount of her request, it was clear that
the niece was asking for more money.").
128. Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
129. Id. But see Harmon, supra note 126, at 23 (questioning whether the result was proper
based on the paucity of evidence that Hinde was close with his family).
130. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (applying substituted
judgment to a case involving a decision to refuse or stop life-sustaining treatment); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (N.J. 1976) (using the substituted judgment analysis to
permit a surrogate to discontinue life support for his incompetent daughter); Strunk v.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 145 (Ky. 1969) (extending the applicability of substituted judgment
to compel an incompetent person to donate his organs and tissue to his brother); see also
Penney Lewis, Procedures that Are Against the Medical Interests of Incompetent Adults, 22
OxroRD J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 584 (2002).
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President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, "when possible, decisionmaking for
incapacitated patients should be guided by the principle of substituted
judgment, which promotes the underlying values of self-determination and
well-being better than the best interests standard does."' 13 1
Unlike Whitbread, courts properly apply the substituted judgment
analysis only in cases where the person once demonstrated competency to
make decisions, but became incompetent later due to an accident, illness, or
other cause. 132  Because surrogates must consider the incompetent
individual's prior values and preferences (and not those of a reasonable
person), a preliminary condition is that the person actually possessed values
and preferences. 133 For this reason, courts rarely apply the substituted
judgment analysis in cases involving children because a child "has no
coherent concept of self, let alone a well-articulated system of ends against
which we may assess issues of rationality."'134  Where children are
concerned, "substituted judgment is a poor choice of words to describe this
decision on behalf of [a] minor child."'135 Second, in order to properly
apply the substituted judgment analysis, it is critical that the previously
competent person expressed a preference about a desired course of
treatment if he or she were to become incompetent. 136 There are two
possible methods of expression: evidence of an advance directive and clear
and convincing evidence of a preference. 137
Advance directives are more than an expression of preferences or values;
they are an act of will, and an expression of deliberate choice. 138 Advance
directives are instructive: A competent person indicates generally or
specifically the type or types of medical treatment options he or she chooses
to have or not have should he or she become incompetent.13 9 Advance
131. THE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 119, at 136; see In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712,
720 (Mass. 1982) (indicating that the doctrine of substituted judgment "promotes best the
interests of the individual").
132. Doe ex rel. Tarlow v. District of Columbia, 489 F.3d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In
re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 455 (D.C. 1999); see CANTOR, supra note 72, at 42, 104 (asserting
that it is illogical to attempt to replicate the decisions of those people who have always
lacked the capacity to make them because there is nothing to replicate).
133. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1250 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); CANTOR, supra note 72, at
103; see ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF
SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 120-21 (1989) (describing how courts can determine the
evidentiary value of a particular prior expression of a preference).
134. David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A
Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1980); see K.I., 735 A.2d at 455
(citing A.C., 573 A.2d 1235; In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d
365 (Fla. 1984)).
135. Frank I. Clark, Withdrawal of Life-Support in the Newborn: Whose Baby Is It?, 23
Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 103 (commenting that, under a substituted judgment
analysis, courts may take into account the incompetent person's religious values and
philosophical preferences).
137. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 133, at 118-19.
138. Id. at 115-16.
139. Id. at95.
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directives are either oral or written, but the latter is greatly preferred in
order to minimize the potential for fraud, duress, or ambiguity.' 40
Examples of written advance directives include living wills or powers of
attorney. 14 1 Advance directives of this nature typically are relevant to
questions involving the elderly, 142 and therefore, are not particularly helpful
when discussing a medical procedure like the "Ashley Treatment."
It is much more likely that the incompetent person did not clearly express
his wishes. When this happens,
a surrogate decisionmaker considers the patient's personal value system
for guidance. The surrogate considers the patient's prior statements about
and reactions to medical issues, and all the facets of the patient's
personality that the surrogate is familiar with-with, of course, particular
reference to his or her relevant philosophical, theological, and ethical
values-in order to extrapolate what course of medical treatment the
patient would choose.1
43
This involves "a synthesis of (1) factors known to be true about the
incompetent and (2) other considerations which necessarily suggest
themselves when the court cannot be sure about an incompetent's actual
wishes."' 44 Factors that are readily ascertainable may include a person's
religious beliefs, 145 philosophical beliefs, 146 value system, and goals.' 47
Other considerations may be "information provided by the patient's family,
and, if applicable, any past decisions the patient may have made regarding
medical care."' 148 Thus, courts applying substituted judgment in this way
may use these factors to authorize decisions for an incompetent individual
that are not necessarily in that individual's best interests, but nonetheless,
represent their preference. 149
When the only evidence courts have is circumstantial (and not an
advance directive), substituted judgment requires that there be "clear and
140. Id. at 118.
141. Id. at 95, 295. Living wills are called instructional advance directives while powers
of attorney are called proxy advance directives. Id. at 95.
142. Id. at 296.
143. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987) (citing In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 56-59
(Mass. 1981)) (footnote omitted).
144. In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 751 (D.C. 1979).
145. See id.
146. CANTOR, supra note 72, at 103.
147. Does v. District of Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113 (D.D.C. 2005).
148. Id.
149. In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 59-60 n.20 (Mass. 1981) ("[I]f an individual would, if
competent, make an unwise or foolish decision, the judge must respect that decision as long
as he would accept the same decision if made by a competent individual in the same
circumstances."); see D. Don Welch, Walking in Their Shoes: Paying Respect to
Incompetent Patients, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1617, 1629 (1989) (recognizing that people often do
not make decisions in their best interests, and the third-party surrogate's responsibility is to
give respect to the incompetent person's particular preference).
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convincing" evidence of the incompetent person's preference. 150  The
Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health defined clear
and convincing evidence as that which
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to
the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear,
direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to
a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue. 151
Many commentators argue that it is impossible to enter the mind of another
whose experiences are so dramatically different. 152  Rebecca Dresser
explains, "The greater the difference between the experiencer and her
observer, the less it is possible for the observer to adopt the experiencer's
point of view." 153 For this reason, if clear and convincing evidence of a
preference is lacking, substituted judgment may not be used 154 because
"many of us harbor severe doubts about the ability of our families, friends,
and caregivers to gain access to the information they would need to make
decisions that truly protected our welfare as incompetent patients."155
2. The Best Interests Test: Separating Good Interests from Best Interests?
Unlike the substituted judgment doctrine, the best interests test is an
objective inquiry.' 56  The best interests analysis requires that courts
examine how a particular medical procedure will affect an incompetent
person mentally and physically, and determine whether such changes will
bring an overall improvement to the person's quality of life. 157 Thus, it is a
comparative test:
150. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990); V.S.D. v. Williams-
Huston, 660 N.E.2d 1064, 1067-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 783
(Me. 1985).
151. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285 n.l 1 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (N.J. 1987))
(alteration in original).
152. See Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients,
46 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 669-70 (1994) (describing the impossibility of comprehending the
"inner worlds of other subjects of experience" by way of an example). Cf THOMAS NAGEL,
What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REV. 435 (1974), reprinted in MORTAL QUESTIONS 165
(1979).
153. Dresser, supra note 152, at 670.
154. See Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1249 (Md. 1982)
(noting that sterilization rarely is in the best interests of the incompetent person). But see In
re Wirsing, 573 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Mich. 1998) (declining to require clear and convincing
evidence).
155. Dresser, supra note 152, at 672.
156. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 107 (articulating that the best interests inquiry is what
a reasonable incompetent person would do under similar circumstances).
157. See William A. Krais, Note, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's
Right of Self-Determination: Right-to-Die, Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J.L.
& MED. 333, 351-52 (1989) (explaining how the best interests analysis forces courts to
balance the advantages and disadvantages of a particular course of treatment); see also
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Mass. 1977).
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[T]he best interest[s] principle instructs us to determine the net benefit for
the patient of each option, assigning different weights to the options to
reflect the relative importance of the various interests they further or
thwart, then subtracting costs or "disbenefits" from the benefits for each
option. The course of action to be followed, then, is the one with the
greatest net benefit to the patient. The mere fact that a treatment would
benefit the patient is not sufficient to show that it would be in the
individual's best interests, since other options may have greater net
benefits, or the costs of the option to the patient-in suffering and
disability-may exceed the benefit. 158
The analysis can be complicated by the fact that a surrogate must
objectively assess the best interests of an incompetent person.159 Logically,
it is extremely difficult for the guardian to distort his perspective in such a
drastic way because of the difference between their frames of reference. 160
Courts consider a number of factors under the best interests test:
In assessing whether a procedure or course of treatment would be in a
patient's best interests, the surrogate must take into account such factors
as the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning,
and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained. An accurate
assessment will encompass consideration of the satisfaction of present
desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions, and the possibility of
developing or regaining the capacity for self-determination.
The impact of a decision on an incapacitated patient's loved ones may
be taken into account in determining someone's best interests, for most
people do have an important interest in the well-being of their families or
close associates. 16 1
Courts generally apply the best interests test narrowly rather than
broadly, meaning that judges prefer to maintain the status quo rather than
approve a risky medical procedure. 162 This is done first and foremost to
avoid abuse. 163 Nonetheless, their prudence inevitably limits surrogates'
ability to authorize certain medical interventions. 164 For example, courts
applying the best interests test have rejected surrogates' petitions to apply
158. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 133, at 123.
159. E.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); see CANTOR, supra note 72, at 107
(emphasizing that the surrogate must not cloud their judgment with their own experience as a
competent individual).
160. See Cantor, supra note 3, at 162; Dresser, supra note 152, at 667 & n.205.
161. THE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 119, at 135 (citing In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40,
58 (Mass. 1981) (footnote omitted).
162. See Donna S. Harkness, "Whenever Justice Requires ": Examining the Elusive Role
of Guardian Ad Litem for Adults with Diminished Capacity, 8 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 1,
25-26 (2006).
163. See THE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 119, at 136.
164. See Lewis, supra note 130, at 587-88 ("Procedures other than treatment, which are
undertaken for a purpose unrelated to the incompetent person's welfare, are generally
considered to fail the best interests test and are therefore not permitted.").
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lifesaving medical treatment, 165 to remove lifesaving medical treatment,1 66
to remove an organ and transplant it into another family member, 167 to
perform nontherapeutic research, 168 and to sterilize. 169 One commentator
suggests that this tentativeness stems from the idea that courts are unsure
whose interests deserve greater merit-those of the incompetent individual
herself or the general rights of human beings as measured by society.' 70
This collision is inevitable, she argues, especially when the incompetent
individual's interests are in direct conflict with those of society. 171
Professor Dresser explains,
If we can count as relevant interests only what patients themselves
experience, then the best interests standard will require aggressive care for
"'persons' that are little more than objects in the world." On the other
hand, if choices are made solely according to what matters to human
beings in general, if relatively sophisticated concerns such as dignity and
privacy are deemed to justify nontreatment, then it seems that the vast
majority of mentally impaired patients' lives will be placed in
jeopardy. 172
In other words, courts, as instruments of society, cannot completely
discount those normative values when applying the best interests test. They
swoop in undetected and inevitably impact judicial decision making.' 73
For cases involving the sterilization of an incompetent minor, courts have
typically followed a general pattern, such as that followed in the case of In
re Grady. 174 First, the ultimate duty to decide whether sterilization is in the
best interests of the child remains with the court, and not the child's
165. In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming the trial court's ruling that
the issuance of a "do not resuscitate" order was in the best interests of the infant child
despite her mother's objection).
166. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). For
a discussion of the facts of Saikewicz, see infra text accompanying notes 200-16.
167. See In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting the court's
analysis in Strunk v. Strunk); see also In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975). But see
Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (authorizing organ transplant surgery);
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (same); In re Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (App.
Div. 1984) (same); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Cir. App. 1979) (same).
168. See generally Lewis, supra note 130.
169. See In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 823 (Colo. 1990); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486
(N.J. 1981); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); In re Hayes,
608 P.2d 635, 641-42 (Wash. 1980).
170. See Dresser, supra note 152, at 657-58.
171. See id. at 658-59 (describing the dual natures of the best interests inquiry); see also
id. at 658 ("The problem is inescapable because it is impossible to separate the incompetent
patient's current interests from a more general conception of the interests of human
beings.").
172. Id. at 659 (quoting Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv.
375,409 (1988)).
173. Id. at 661 ("It is disingenuous to contend that the best interests approach can be
completely separated from broader social judgments about what gives life value to human
beings.").
174. 426 A.2d 467; see also Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1385; Hayes, 608 P.2d at 641.
[Vol. 77
2008] STERILIZING THE PROFOUNDLYINCOMPETENT 307
parents. 175 Second, the court must appoint an independent guardian ad
litem, and also meet with the incompetent child.1 76 Third, the party
requesting sterilization must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the individual is incapable of making a decision about sterilization and that
this inability is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future. 177 If these
initial hurdles are overcome, a court will ultimately determine whether
sterilization is in the best interests of the incompetent child. 178
Incapacity must be proven, and is never assumed: because an individual
lacks the capacity to make one kind of decision does not automatically
mean that she lacks capacity for another decision. 179 What does it mean to
lack capacity to consent to sterilization? A technical understanding of the
surgical procedure and its risks is not necessary.18 0 A person need not
understand the attendant risks and complications of pregnancy and
childbirth. 18 1  Even a low intelligence quotient does not permit the
inference that the person lacks the capacity to consent to sterilization. 182
What is required is that the incompetent person understands that
sterilization involves a surgical procedure, and that the procedure will result
in an inability to bear children.18 3
If a court is satisfied that the foregoing factors are met, the court will
make the ultimate determination of whether sterilization is in the best
interests of the incompetent child. 184 Courts typically assess the following
nine factors offered in Grady for cases involving requests to sterilize an
incompetent child:
175. See Grady, 426 A.2d at 482 (citing U.S. Supreme Court cases that recognize a
parent's involvement and interest in their child's decisions, but asserting that this interest
must yield to the child's right to control his or her own reproduction).
176. Id. (charging the guardian with a duty of meeting with the child and offering
evidence and witnesses at the hearing, and advocating that judges meet with the child to
construct their own impressions of competency); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed.
2004) (defining guardian ad litem as one who appears in court on behalf of an incompetent
or minor party).
177. See Grady, 426 A.2d at 482-83 (noting that varying degrees of mental disability can
make people legally incompetent to make some decisions, but capable of comprehending the
decision to sterilize); see also In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. 1990); In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d 712, 721 & n.7 (Mass. 1982) (indicating that delaying sterilization may have adverse
consequences in some situations).
178. See Grady, 426 A.2d at 483 (presenting nine factors that the court should consider,
but recognizing that these factors are not exclusive); infra text accompanying note 185
(listing the specific factors considered in Grady).
179. Id.; see BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 133, at 18-19.
180. Romero, 790 P.2d at 823; Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 721-22 n.8.
181. Romero, 790 P.2d at 823.
182. Cf In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Mildred
Terwilliger had an I.Q. of thirty-three, but expressed an understanding of the consequences
of sterilization. The case was remanded for greater fact finding. Id. at 1386.
183. Larry 0. Gostin, Consent to Involuntary and Non-medically Indicated Sterilization
of Mentally Retarded Adults and Children, in STERILIZATION AND MENTAL HANDICAP, supra
note 100, at 38, 40.
184. See Grady, 426 A.2d at 483. Courts may also order sterilization based on a finding
of clear and convincing evidence that the procedure is "medically essential." In re A.W., 637
P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981) (en bane).
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* Whether pregnancy is possible;
* Whether pregnancy or sterilization will cause the child
trauma or psychological damage;
* The likelihood that the child will encounter forced or
consensual sexual situations;
* The child's capacity to comprehend reproduction or
contraception, and the likelihood it will change;
* Whether medical advances in the present or foreseeable
future will offer any less drastic methods;
* Whether postponement of sterilization at the time of the
petition is advisable;
* Whether the child will be able to care for a baby on her
own or with a marital partner;
* Whether any medical breakthroughs are expected that
could improve the person's condition or make sterilization
less drastic; and
* A showing that the petitioners seek sterilization of the
ward in good faith and in her best interests, rather than for
their own or society's benefit.185
Courts will weigh these nonexhaustive factors "as the particular
circumstances dictate."' 186  When considered in totality, they must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is in the
child's best interests. 187
II. THE DIVERSE APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT AND BEST
INTERESTS TEST
Part I described the current constitutional constraints on courts deciding
sterilization cases involving profoundly incompetent children and the legal
standards that have developed as a result of that jurisprudence. While the
substituted judgment standard asks, "What would this patient choose if she
were competent?"' 188 the best interests test attempts to determine 'what a
reasonable person with the characteristics of the incompetent would [do]
under similar circumstances. "'189 However, assuming the perspective of an
incompetent individual, whether objective or subjective, poses several
185. Grady, 426 A.2d at 483.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 486.
188. See Dresser, supra note 152, at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. CANTOR, supra note 72, at 107 (quoting Paul B. Solnick, Proxy Consent for
Incompetent Non-Terminally Ill Adult Patients, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 15 (1985)).
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problems. 190 Part II describes how courts have varied their application of
these legal standards depending upon the particular facts of the case. Part
II.A.1 describes how courts may sometimes incorrectly apply the best
interests standard while purporting to apply the substituted judgment
standard, thus creating an erroneous hybrid standard. This section also
provides one specific case example of this hybrid approach. Part II.A.2
asserts that the rationale behind this hybrid approach may be
understandable, but as a result, it has created confusing judicial precedent in
an area of rising importance. Part II.B indicates how one commentator has
attempted to resolve the confusion by applying a best interests test that
emphasizes extrinsic concerns that are particularly relevant to the
incompetent individual at issue. Part II.B provides another case example
which demonstrates how an emphasis on extrinsic considerations may
permit courts to authorize extreme medical procedures in limited situations.
However, other legal commentators have argued that courts cannot simply
rely on extrinsic factors, but must balance them against other more
objective standards when making their decisions. Part II.C explains their
theories and the reasons behind them.
A. The Hybridization of the Substituted Judgment and Best Interests
Analyses
1. Confusing the Doctrines
Courts often combine the substituted judgment analysis with the best
interests test, creating a hybrid 19 1 substituted judgment-best interests test. 192
When hybridization occurs, the court asserts its intention to apply the
substituted judgment analysis, but actually applies a best interests
analysis. 193 This happens when a court improperly uses the best interests
test to determine the interests of a never-competent individual or an
individual who lost competency, but never expressed a preference. 194 In
these instances, because courts have no indication of a preference, courts
perform a weighing analysis that compares the person's present situation
190. Id. at 107-13.
191. See, e.g., Adam Marshall, Comment, Choices for a Child: An Ethical and Legal
Analysis of a Failed Surrogate Birth Contract, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 275, 296 (1996).
Norman L. Cantor refers to this type of analysis as a "melding or blending of the substituted-
judgment and best-interests standards." See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 42.
192. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977); see also Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969); Wentzel v. Montgomery
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1259 (Md. 1982).
193. See Alan B. Handler, Individual Worth, 17 HOFsTRA L. REv. 493, 514 (1989)
(characterizing the hybrid analysis as "a best interest[s] analysis ... cloaked in a substituted-
judgment formulation"); see also Stewart G. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes
Them and by What Standards?, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 505, 525-30 (1989).
194. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 133, at 113-15 (describing the two instances
of misapplication).
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with the potential future gains. 195 In weighing the pros and cons of a
particular medical procedure, the court is attempting to fill in the missing
pieces that are left either because the person was born incompetent, or
because he neither expressed a prior preference nor developed a value
system. 196 Courts indicate that they are applying the substituted judgment
analysis by "don[ning] the mental mantle of the incompetent," leading to a
result that is in conformity with the incompetent individual's values and
belief system. 197  In actuality, however, courts are not assuming the
individual's point of view. Instead, the court is performing a best interests-
type analysis that weighs the person's future pleasure and pain in an attempt
to project what the person would have desired. 198  The result, one
commentator asserts, is an obvious fabrication. 199
A clear example of this hybrid application is Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz.200 Joseph Saikewicz was sixty-seven years old,
profoundly incompetent since birth,20 1 and suffering from a fatal type of
leukemia.202 Saikewicz's guardian ad litem203 requested permission to
withhold chemotherapy treatment from Saikewicz despite the fact that it
was the advised course of treatment. 20 4 The guardian ad litem explained
his decision was based on evidence that Saikewicz could not comprehend
the medicinal benefits of the treatment, but would experience all the pain
and fear associated with chemotherapy. 205
In addition to the guardian's testimony, several factors strongly
suggested that chemotherapy treatment was not in Saikewicz's best
interests. 206 First, his age made it more likely that he would not tolerate
chemotherapy as well as a younger person. 20 7 Second, there were probable
side effects to chemotherapy, such as severe nausea, bladder irritation,
195. CANTOR, supra note 72, at 160; see also id. at 106.
196. See In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 751 (D.C. 1979) (citing Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at
430); see also CANTOR, supra note 72, at 103.
197. In re Carson, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1962); see also Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 430-31.
198. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 105 (relying on the best interests test of the
incompetent individual in the absence of an articulated choice).
199. See Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 145 (1986), reprinted in FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 3, 20-23 (1992).
But see Lewis, supra note 130, at 616 ('" It is not that we are lying in these cases; we are
genuinely torn.... [W]hen we are forced to compromise, we need to hide the trade-off and
to profess continued respect for the value that lost out."' (quoting Richard W. Garnett, Why
Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW.
455, 487 (1996))).
200. 370 N.E.2d 417.
201. Id. at 420, 430 (indicating that Saikewicz had an I.Q. of ten, a mental age of
approximately two years and eight months, and had been "noncommunicative" since birth).
202. See id. at 420-21.
203. See supra note 176.
204. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
205. Id. at 430.
206. See id. at 432 (describing how the court considered Saikewicz's age, improbability
of recovery, side effects, and present and future comfort).
207. Id. at432 n.17.
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numbness and tingling of his extremities, and hair loss. 20 8 Third, there was
a low likelihood that chemotherapy would cause the cancer to go into
remission. 209  Fourth, the record clearly indicated that chemotherapy
treatment would definitely cause immediate suffering.2 10 Fifth, Saikewicz
had resisted treatment in the past, and the record revealed this resistance
was based on the fear, confusion, and pain the treatment caused.211 Lastly,
the judge concluded that Saikewicz's subjective quality of life would
decrease if he were given the treatment because the treatment would
disorient and frighten him.212 The judge considered these factors against
the reasons provided for administering chemotherapy treatment-that most
people choose to endure chemotherapy and the potential to live a longer
life.213 The court weighed the reasons for and against the treatment plan,
and ultimately concluded that Saikewicz would have performed this same
balancing test had he been competent. 2 14 The court rationalized the result
by associating Saikewicz with the same mental processes of a competent
person. 215 In theory, this effort was to "afford to that person the same
panoply of rights and choices [that the state] recognizes in competent
persons." 216
Saikewicz exemplifies this hybrid type of application because the court
concluded that the correct application of substituted judgment was to
determine the decision that "would be made by the incompetent person, if
that person were competent, but taking into account the present and future
incompetency of the individual .... ,,217 The court asserted its intention to
apply the substituted judgment analysis despite having no evidence of
Saikewicz's preference for or against chemotherapy. 218  Substituted
judgment requires that the court determine precisely what Saikewicz would
have elected if he were competent. Instead, however, the court weighed
reasons for and against treating Saikewicz with chemotherapy. 219 This kind
of analysis embodies more of a best interests test.220 The Saikewicz court
assumed that had Saikewicz been competent, he would have performed this
weighing analysis and decided that chemotherapy was not in his best







215. See, e.g., id. at 431-42 (asserting that four of the six factors weighing against
chemotherapy treatment were "considerations that any individual would weigh carefully");
see also supra text accompanying notes 124-29.




220. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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interests. 221  Therefore, the Saikewicz court applied a best interests
weighing test rather than requiring an advance directive or clear and
convincing evidence of a preference. The court "selected a medical course
for [Saikewicz] that the court believed would best promote [his] interests in
avoiding suffering and deriving satisfaction or pleasure from
existence." 222
2. The Rationale Behind the Hybrid Analysis
As Part II.A. 1 alluded, the hybrid analysis is a best interests test
disguised as substituted judgment. Why do courts mistakenly indicate that
they are performing a substituted judgment analysis when they really are
performing a best interests analysis? One reason to perform a hybrid
application is to satisfy a societal interest in protecting a profoundly
incompetent individual's personal autonomy rights. 223  The substituted
judgment analysis is preferred over the best interests test because it
"promotes the underlying values of self-determination and well-being better
than the best interests standard does." 224 Applying substituted judgment
implements the individual's prior choice whereas the best interests test
merely attempts to discern it. By purporting to apply the substituted
judgment test, the court may be trying to validate its argument by
describing the treatment as the patient's choice, even though there is no
evidence of that conclusion. 225 Giving effect to a proposal that is the
patient's choice is a relief to judges when the proposal is consistent with the
patient's existing condition.226
Another reason is that inborn profoundly incompetent individuals have
never developed preferences, beliefs, or a system of values. 227 Therefore,
surrogate decision making for these individuals is limited to the best
interests test. The best interests test is objective, requiring that the
"surrogate decisionmaker . . . choose a course that will promote the
patient's well-being as it would probably be conceived by a reasonable
221. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32 (stating that Saikewicz would, like any
individual, weigh the pros and cons of the treatment and ultimately conclude that he was
better off without chemotherapy).
222. See Cantor, supra note 3, at 160.
223. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 133, at 113 (describing how two cases
rationalized applying substituted judgment to an incompetent person who had never
expressed a preference because to not do so would deny that person of a fundamental right);
see, e.g., supra text accompanying note 216.
224. THE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 119, at 136.
225. See generally Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (authorizing the removal
of a kidney from an incompetent person so that it could be transplanted into his brother).
226. Dresser, supra note 152, at 624. ("When a directive is consistent with the best
interests and reasonableness standards ...decisionmakers, relieved at the opportunity to
escape the full psychological burden of responsibility for determining the patient's fate, are
typically happy to honor it.... [T]hese directives are welcome reinforcements of what seem
to most of us good decisions, given the circumstances.").
227. See supra note 3.
[Vol. 77
2008] STERILIZING THE PROFOUNDLY INCOMPETENT 313
person in the patient's circumstances. '228 Surrogates "must scrupulously
adhere to the disabled person's perspective in discerning the levels of
suffering and gratification actually present (or foreseeable) in any
individual case." 229 Performing this assessment is much easier said than
done.
Professor Dresser describes how courts have attempted this feat. First,
courts hear evidence on the person's medical condition or disability and
how caregivers, family, and medical staff have interacted with the
person.2 30 Using this information, the judge "filters" the information using
his own "moral lens" to decide what the evidence reveals about the
incompetent individual's own subjective experience. 23 1 Many times, the
filtration process reveals contradictory results. 232 This is especially true
when courts analyze cases involving semiconscious and conscious
individuals who cannot clearly provide guidance. 233
Dresser is dissatisfied with this method because the judge's sense of
morality has a direct impact on how he or she will resolve the case:
Because the patients themselves are incapable of describing what their
lives are like, there is fertile ground for disagreement. What is "known"
about a patient is malleable, molded by the observers' own views on
whether treatment could provide the patient with a life worth living.
Quality of life constitutes the ineluctable lens through which judges
perceive incompetent patients.2 34
Differing notions of morality and extreme surrogate requests create
inconsistency in the case law and reinforce the uncertainty of profoundly
incompetent individuals' realities. 235 But because morality is linked to a
number of constitutional guarantees, completely disregarding it would be
improper. 236 How then do judges use their notions of morality to bring
consistency to the case law?
B. A Whole New World.- Shifting the Focus to Emphasize Extrinsic
Concerns that Are Relevant to the Particular Individual
Many applications of the best interests test have emphasized extrinsic
considerations. Penney Lewis explains that extrinsic considerations are
those interests that "focus[] on the incompetent person's psychological and
social interests." 237 Examples of psychological interests include the interest
228. THE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 119, at 136.
229. Cantor, supra note 3, at 161.
230. Dresser, supra note 152, at 640.
231. Id. at 640-43.
232. Id. at 641-42 (describing three examples).
233. See id. at 643-47.
234. Id. at 647.
235. Id. at 642-47.
236. See Joel Feinberg, In Defense of Moral Rights: Their Constitutional Relevance, in
FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT supra note 199, at 245.
237. Lewis, supra note 130, at 588.
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in maintaining a close emotional relationship with another, the interest in
receiving continued care from another, and the interest in receiving
improved medical care. 238 When examining psychological interests like
these, Professor Lewis cautions that "care must be taken to avoid this
benefit being presumed rather than proved.... [because] such benefits are
difficult to predict, speculative and lacking in evidentiary support. '239
Social interests are those that should be "encouraged and facilitated"
because such a procedure is a "societal good. '240 For these interests to
come into play, the treatment proposed must be in the best interests of the
incompetent individual. 241 If the incompetent person expressed a prior
preference, permitting the use of the substituted judgment standard, then the
proposed procedure may be authorized even if it is not in the person's best
interests. 242 If the procedure is a societal interest, but it is not in the best
interests of the incompetent person, and the situation is not one where the
substituted judgment standard may be used, the procedure may still be
lawful. In this instance, "[a]dditional criteria might also be imposed, such
as that the harm to the incompetent person not be greater than a specified
threshold, or that the incompetent person does not dissent. '243 The Law
Commission of England and Wales has considered using societal interest as
a means of promoting a procedure not in the best interests of an
incompetent individual, such as elective ventilation and genetic
screening.244
Professor Dresser offers a standard that she calls a "revised best-interests
principle," which "both protects patients' experiential welfare and permits
surrogate decisionmakers to choose from an array of reasonable treatment
options." 245 The revised best-interests principle attempts to "stand in the
patient's shoes, to understand the situation as it is for her," and also "permit
us to exercise empathy in the context of a broader community to which the
patient belongs." 246 This "broader community" to which Dresser refers is
actually the small subjective world in which the incompetent person
lives. 247 She explains that some individuals are so extremely impaired that
their disability breaks that person's connection to the outside world,
permitting treatment options that ordinarily may be considered extreme for
competent individuals, but are reasonable for profoundly incompetent ones:
Some impaired patients can be kept alive only if they are substantially
restrained, sedated, or otherwise restricted. If the necessary restrictions
are extreme, and no less drastic means of treatment delivery are available,
238. See generally id. at 588-93.
239. Id. at 589 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 596.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. (citation omitted).
244. Id.
245. See generally Dresser, supra note 152, at 617.
246. Id. at 665.
247. Id.
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the best interests standard should permit the treatment to stop. Similarly,
the best interests standard should leave room for nontreatment when a
patient's conscious awareness is significantly impoverished, because a
near absence of human experiences sufficiently diminishes the value a
patient can obtain from life. Such patients are so removed from the
human condition that we can defensibly say that a failure to treat is of no
harm to them. 24
8
Dresser acknowledges that it is difficult to uncover the subjective
experiences of others, but instead of conceding defeat, she advocates "using
available tools to investigate and make judgments on how particular
patients experience their lives." 249 Our everyday life experiences may not
be sufficient in cases involving people who are different from ourselves. 250
People must combine their "subjective imaginations with the objective
knowledge achievable through scientific, clinical, and everyday
observation." 25 1 Assessments involving conscious incompetent individuals
are difficult and demand "extreme caution." 252  Nonetheless, Dresser
contends that "uncertainty about a patient's mental experiences should not
lead to their exclusion from the treatment calculation." 253 After using
available tools, it may become clear from the facts that a request that
objectively appears extreme is actually subjectively reasonable for the
profoundly incompetent patient.
Strunk v. Strunk254 demonstrates Dresser's theory that courts may
authorize an extreme procedure using an assessment of the incompetent
individual's connection to the world based on his incapacity. In Strunk, a
divided 4-3 court granted two parents' request to transplant one kidney
from their incompetent son (Jerry) to their competent son (Tommy). 255
Tommy suffered from a fatal kidney disease, and, without the transplant
operation, he would die.256 Doctors tested the entire family for a donor
match, but only Jerry was a "highly acceptable" donor match. 257 Jerry's
incompetence caused him to have a speech defect, which limited his ability
to communicate with people "not well acquainted with him." 258 The court
248. Id. at 665-66; see also Lewis, supra note 130, at 577-78 (describing procedures that
may not confer a medical benefit, but provide other benefits).
249. Dresser, supra note 152, at 666-81 (articulating several theories offered by
philosophers).
250. Id. at 668-69. However, Professor John R. Searle contends that we can relate our
everyday experiences to differently situated individuals using a "same causes-same effects
and similar causes-similar effects" principle. See id. at 674-75 (emphasis omitted).
251. Id. at 674 (citing NAGEL, supra note 152, at 169).
252. See Dresser, supra note 152, at 698 ("At present, it is impossible to make third-
person determinations about the nature of a conscious incompetent patient's experiential
world with the same assurance that is possible for determinations that patients are incapable
of any experiences at all.").
253. Id.
254. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 145.
257. Id. at 146.
258. Id.
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found that Jerry's I.Q. was approximately thirty-five, giving him the mental
age around that of a six-year-old. 259 Therefore, consent was an issue, and
the parents requested that the court grant permission to proceed with the
surgery.260
The majority applied the hybrid analysis, but gave great weight to
evidence indicating that the transplant would psychologically benefit
Jerry.261 Ultimately, the court was convinced by evidence indicating that
Tommy represented Jerry's connection to the family, and keeping Tommy
alive preserved that connection.262 The Kentucky Department of Mental
Health, which entered the case as amicus curiae, described the importance
of maintaining Jerry's sense of self, which was dependent upon family
continuity:
It is difficult for the mental defective to establish a firm sense of identity
with another person and the acquisition of this necessary identity is
dependent upon a person whom one can conveniently accept as a model
and who at the same time is sufficiently flexible to allow the defective to
detach himself with reassurances of continuity. His need to be social is
not so much the necessity of a formal and mechanical contact with other
human beings as it is the necessity of a close intimacy with other men, the
desirability of a real community of feeling, an urgent need for a unity of
understanding. Purely mechanical and formal contact with other men
does not offer any treatment for the behavior of a mental defective; only
those who are able to communicate intimately are of value to hospital
treatment in these cases. And this generally is a member of the family.263
The majority in Strunk ultimately authorized the kidney transplant
because it preserved the family by keeping Tommy alive. 264  The
"preservation of the family" was the true benefit the operation bestowed
upon Jerry because, psychologically, Jerry was able to continue to feel close
to another human being.265 The majority considered the disadvantage of
the transplant surgery-the risk inherent in removing Jerry's kidney-but
concluded that the risk was minimal, equating it to the risk of driving a car
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 146, 148-49 (purportedly using substituted judgment, but basing the
analysis on a balancing of the risks and benefits of the treatment); see also Lynn E. Lebit,
Note, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors and Incompetents and
Misapplication of the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 7 J.L. & Health 107, 112-14 (1992).
This "psychological benefit" has also been recognized outside of the United States. See
Lewis, supra note 130, at 588.
262. See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146-47.
263. Id. at 146.
264. See id. at 147 (indicating that if Tommy died, when his parents died, "Jerry [would]
have no concerned, intimate communication so necessary to his stability and optimal
functioning") (internal quotation marks omitted)).
265. Id. at 146-49 (drawing support from English law). But see In re John Doe, 481
N.Y.S.2d 932 (App. Div. 1984) (per curium) (permitting a bone marrow transplant from a
profoundly incompetent man to his competent brother despite a lack of evidence that the
ward was emotionally attached to his brother).
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sixteen miles on every working day.266 The dissent attacked the majority's
emphasis on "nebulous" psychological benefits, and concluded that the
likelihood that the transplant surgery would be a success was too
attenuated. 267
It was impossible to conclude whether an incompetent individual like
Jerry would have consented to the transplant surgery.2 68 Nonetheless, many
courts rely on Strunk's precedent, recognizing the importance of the
psychological benefits.269 For instance, the court in In re Roe considered
the issue of "whether the guardian of a mentally ill person possesses the
inherent authority to consent to the forcible administration of antipsychotic
medication to his noninstitutionalized ward in the absence of an
emergency." 270  The court identified six factors as relevant to its
-determination using the substituted judgment standard. 2 71 The third factor
the court considered was the impact upon the individual's family:
An individual who is part of a closely knit family would doubtless take
into account the impact his acceptance or refusal of treatment would
likely have on his family. Such a factor is likewise to be considered in
determining the probable wishes of one who is incapable of formulating
or expressing them himself. In any choice between proposed treatments
which entail grossly different expenditures of time or money by the
incompetent's family, it would be appropriate to consider whether a factor
in the incompetent's decision would have been the desire to minimize the
burden on his family.... If an incompetent has enjoyed close family
relationships and subsequently is forced to choose between two
treatments, one of which will allow him to live at home with his family
and the other of which will require the relative isolation of an institution,
then the judge must weigh in his determination the affection and
assistance offered by the incompetent's family.272
As Roe reveals, while it is extremely difficult "'for the fully competent
person to have the sympathetic insight ... into what it is like' to experience
the world with gravely diminished mental function," 273 "uncertainty about a
patient's mental experiences should not lead to their exclusion from the
treatment calculation." 274
It is important to remember that evidence of psychological benefit does
not automatically permit the authorization of a controversial medical
266. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148-49.
267. Id. at 150 (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 146; see supra note 252 and accompanying text.
269. See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 498-500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Hart v. Brown,
289 A.2d 386, 390-91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
270. In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Mass. 1981).
271. Id. at 56-59.
272. Id. at 58 (noting, however, that "the judge must be careful to avoid examination of
these factors in any manner other than one actually designed and intended to effectuate the
incompetent's right to self-determination").
273. CANTOR, supra note 72, at 107 (quoting R.S. DOwNIE & K.C. CALMAN, HEALTHY
RESPECT: ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE 75 (2d ed. 1994)).
274. Dresser, supra note 152, at 698.
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procedure. The court in Roe reminded the parties that "the judge must be
careful to avoid examination of the[] factors in any manner other than one
actually designed and intended to effectuate the incompetent's right to self-
determination." 275 Thus, courts must balance the benefits and burdens of
the procedure and determine whether the treatment produces the greatest
total benefit.276
A paradigmatic example of the balancing that courts perform can be
found in In re Storar, in which the court refused to discontinue blood
transfusions for a profoundly incompetent man named John Storar who was
afflicted with cancer.277  Storar's mother refused to consent to the
administration of the blood transfusions so a state official petitioned the
court for formal permission.278  Experts testified that, without blood
transfusions every eight to fifteen days, Storar's blood would not contain
sufficient oxygen to maintain his body, and eventually he would bleed to
death. 279  With the transfusions, he had energy to engage in regular
activities, such as eating, showering, walking, and even running.280
Conflicting expert testimony, however, indicated that the transfusions
were merely prolonging his suffering. 281 The trial court made several
findings of fact. First, on a personal level, Storar did not enjoy receiving
the treatment. 282 The transfusions increased the amount of blood and blood
clots in his urine, which made him uncomfortable and confused.283 Due to
his incompetence, he did not understand why he was receiving the
treatment, and even resisted forcibly on two occasions.284 Despite his
increase in energy, he became more withdrawn-staying in his room more
than he did before the treatments began.285 The court also recognized that
Storar's mother was keenly aware of her son's emotions and had his best
interests in mind in making the request to stop treatment:
[H]is mother over his lifetime had come to know and sense his wants and
needs and was acutely sensitive to his best interests; that she had provided
more love, personal care, and affection for John than any other person or
275. Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 58.
276. See supra text accompanying note 158.
277. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981), superceded by statute, N.Y. SURR. CT.
PROC. ACT LAW §§ 1750, 1750-a (McKinney 2003).
278. Id. at 66.
279. Id. at 69.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 69-70; id. at 78 (Jones, J., dissenting in part) ("[T]he blood forced on him did
not serve a curative purpose or offer a reasonable hope of benefit .... ").
282. According to the majority, "[i]t was conceded that John Storer [sic] found the
transfusions disagreeable." Id. at 69.
283. Id. The transfusions made urination more painful. Id. at 78 (Jones, J., dissenting in
part).
284. His resistance was obvious: on one occasion, medical staff had to physically restrain
him by tying down his arm to prevent him from pulling out the transfusion needle. Id. at 78.
To solve this problem, doctors began giving Storar sedatives and pain medication prior to the
transfusion. Id. at 69.
285. Id. at 78 (Jones, J., dissenting in part).
[Vol. 77
2008] STERILIZING THE PROFOUNDLY INCOMPETENT 319
institution, and was closer to feeling what John was feeling than anyone
else; that his best interests were of crucial importance to her .... 286
Despite Storar's obvious discomfort and resistance to the treatment, the
court concluded that the transfusions should be continued because they
were akin to food, were not excessively painful, and helped maintain his
regular mental and physical activity.2 87 Thus, in the court's view, the
benefit the treatment brought greatly outweighed the disadvantages of
treatment. 288 Evidence that his mother in good faith requested the cessation
of treatment and that Storar disliked the treatments and became more
withdrawn afterward were not sufficient for the majority.
C. Moving Past Psychology: What Else May Be Considered Important to a
Profoundly Incompetent Individual?
Strunk and Storar demonstrate Professor Dresser's point that courts draw
different conclusions from the facts presented based on the judge's notions
of morality, reasonability, and the considerations weighed. Determining
whether a particular medical treatment is in the incompetent individual's
best interests inherently involves a question that is framed by
reasonability. 289 This objective can easily become obscured.
Dresser proposes that courts "focus more carefully on ... the interests
and pressures that shape actual treatment choices-the patient's current
condition, her prognosis, the concerns of those who love and care for her,
and the concerns of the larger community to which she belongs. 29 0
Several scholars have similarly advocated for a multidimensional analysis
to determine whether a treatment proposal is in the best interests of an
incompetent individual.29 1
Examining how a medical procedure will affect other interests besides
the person's legal rights ensures that the court is gaining a well-rounded
perspective of the individual. Such extrinsic benefits that are unrelated to
the medical procedure include the patient's emotional frailty, psychological
well-being, social relationship with her family and within its infrastructure,
and the social benefit the procedure may provide. 292
Elizabeth Scott has advocated expanding the typical best interests
analysis that occurs in sterilization cases to include other extrinsic
interests.293 The "autonomy model," as Professor Scott dubs it, suggests
that the analysis should center around three basic inquiries about the
incompetent individual: (1) whether the incompetent person has a
substantive interest in producing children, or (2) whether there is a
286. Id. at 78-79.
287. Id. at 69, 73.
288. Id. at 73.
289. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 107.
290. Dresser, supra note 152, at 616.
291. See Scott, supra note 97, at 822-24.
292. See Lewis, supra note 130, at 588-90.
293. See generally Scott, supra note 97.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
substantive interest in avoiding pregnancy, and (3) whether the child is
capable of exercising meaningful reproductive choice. 294 She then expands
the analysis by examining the appropriateness of sterilization as a means of
promoting family stability and longevity. 295
According to Scott, an incompetent woman may or may not possess a
similar substantive interest in procreation or sterilization as compared to a
competent woman. 296 Traditionally, an individual possesses a substantive
interest in producing children if she has the intent and ability to assume a
parental capacity. 297 To assume a parental capacity, the individual must be
capable of performing basic parenting responsibilities. 298 This does not
mean that the person would make a good parent, she argues, for that would
place an unequally high standard of parentability on incompetent
individuals and not on competent ones. Rather, the person need only be
capable of providing minimally adequate care. 299 Under this view, it
follows that profoundly incompetent individuals do not have a legally
protectable interest in procreation. 300 This proposition is supported by state
statutes. 30 1 If a person lacks a legally protectable interest in procreation,
sterilization may be permissible, but that conclusion is not automatic. 302
Courts must then examine "nonreproductive considerations such as medical
risks and benefits, human dignity, privacy, and family continuity and
stability." 303
Critics of Scott's model question whether it can adequately protect an
incompetent minor's constitutional interest in procreation. The law
recognizes that all persons have a right to make decisions regarding their
own reproductive capacities. 304 Scott's model, however, operates under the
assumption that only those people who can function as minimally adequate
parents retain an interest in procreation. 305 This disparate treatment of
individuals is criticized as affording individuals different rights based on
mental capacity. 306 Ultimately, critics argue that a method like this may
294. See Scott, supra note 97, at 825-26.
295. See id. at 845 (noting how the current model typically ignores the importance of
family stability or presupposes that the parents' request conflicts with the child's interest).
296. See id. at 826-27.
297. See id. at 829 ("It is the objective of rearing the child-of establishing a family-
that elevates the right to procreate to a lofty status.").
298. Id.
299. Id. at 849.
300. Id. at 832.
301. Professor Elizabeth Scott cites Montana, Ohio, and Utah as having "laws [that]
acknowledge that the incompetent person's interest in avoiding pregnancy is more important
than a theoretical interest in reproduction." Id. at 832-33 & n.88 (citing MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-5-321(2)(c) (2007); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.271(c) (LexisNexis 1953); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-5-321(1)(c) (1993)).
302. Id. at 841.
303. Id.
304. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
305. See Scott, supra note 97, at 849-50.
306. See supra Part I.A. I (describing two divergent theories of personhood).
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grant courts too much power over the lives of mentally incompetent
children. 307
Even Scott concedes that her autonomy model could lead to an
unwarranted decision to sterilize, but she proposes several safeguards to
protect against this possibility.30 8  Because Scott's model permits
sterilization if review of other extrinsic factors is compelling, there is a
concern that parents will make decisions for their children solely based on
their convenience, rather than what is in the child's best interests. 30 9
Parents may embellish, even falsify reasons why the treatment is in the
child's best interests. 310 As the Supreme Court has very clearly articulated,
"Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves." 3 11  In order for protections to be
adequate, courts should consider parents' interests, but not be persuaded by
overstatements. 31
2
III. TOWARD A MORE FLEXIBLE STANDARD FOR THE
PROFOUNDLY DISABLED
"Nondisabled Americans do not understand disabled ones," writes Joseph
Shapiro.3 13 In fact, this is the very problem that is inherent within judicial
decision making governing the sterilization of profoundly incompetent
individuals. The substituted judgment analysis and the best interests test
are the two methods that United States courts have designed and currently
use as guides for determining whether sterilization is an appropriate
procedure to use on profoundly incompetent children. 3 14 However, judges
are not mind readers. Absent an advance directive,3 15 the substituted
judgment test has no relevance. 3 16 Thus, judges are left with a best interests
test. The best interests test depends upon the judge's ability to extrapolate
307. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
308. Scott, supra note 97, at 852-53. Such safeguards include a comprehensive
evaluation of the decision to sterilize by an expert in mental retardation, a mechanism to
review the findings of competency, and judicial review or review by a committee modeled
after a hospital ethics committee. Id.
309. See id. at 843 n.128.
310. See John Fletcher, Human Experimentation: Ethics in the Consent Situation, 32
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 620, 637 (1967).
311. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
312. See Scott, supra note 97, at 855-57. This is especially important when parents
request a hysterectomy. In this case, the convenience flowing to the parents from
discontinued menstruation may outweigh the benefit to the child or the risk of the procedure.
Id. at 843, 855.
313. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 3 (1993).
314. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A.
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the incompetent individual's reality from the evidence presented. 317 This is
an extremely difficult and virtually impossible undertaking given that the
evidence in cases involving profoundly incompetent individuals is uncertain
and based largely on conjecture. 318
Even when attempting to compile evidence, courts are unsure of which
factors to emphasize. Sterilization cases like Grady weigh several factors,
with psychological benefit being only one consideration of many.319 Courts
considering sterilization requests do not weigh psychology as heavily as
others,320 or they may not consider it at all.321 In contrast, nonsterilization
cases that have applied the best interests test-such as Storar and Strunk-
have relied heavily upon extrinsic considerations such as the psychological,
emotional, or familial benefits that flow from the treatment plan.322 As a
result, judges reach different conclusions because of their different
perceptions of the facts. 323
Part III.A evaluates the substituted judgment and best interest legal tests
and commentator proposals presented in Part II and their value as guiding
standards for the "Ashley Treatment." Part III.B proposes that courts
perform an intensive factual investigation using available tools and methods
of investigation proposed by Professor Dresser. In this investigation, courts
may consider extrinsic considerations as well as more objective evidence.
Upon examining all the evidence, courts may be permitted to grant a
petition to proceed with the "Ashley Treatment" without sacrificing any of
the liberties and rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
A. Evaluating the Application of Current Legal Doctrine to Cases
Involving the "Ashley Treatment"
The Saikewicz hybrid decision demonstrates that judges make mistakes in
applying these standards. 324 The hybrid model is confusing and illogical
when applied to a profoundly incompetent individual. 325 The hybrid
analysis also permits courts to support an irrational conclusion by using
"evidence" of the preferences and values of an incompetent person when in
fact no such evidence exists. 326 Nonetheless, this fagade is grounded in the
317. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
318. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 106-13.
319. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (listing the Grady factors); see also In re
Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641-42 (Wash. 1980).
320. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Hayes, 608 P.2d at 641-42.
322. See supra Part II.B-C; see also notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
323. See supra text accompanying note 235.
324. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
325. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 36-37; Pollack, supra note 193, at 512.
326. See CANTOR, supra note 72, at 37; Dresser, supra note 152, at 633; compare Strunk
v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969) (permitting an incompetent person to donate his
kidney to his brother without informed consent because losing the brother would be
emotionally harmful to the incompetent person), with Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 420-21 (Mass. 1977) (accepting the surrogate's evidence that
chemotherapy would cause more harm than benefit to the profoundly disabled patient).
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admirable goal of best promoting the interests of the disabled person.327 By
allowing courts to sanction medical procedures that are objectively extreme,
this model recognizes that what is extreme for a competent individual may
be reasonable for a profoundly incompetent individual. 328 For a court to
legally approve of the application of the "Ashley Treatment," there needs to
be a flexible, yet constitutional model in place that does not create
confusing legal precedent.
Professor Dresser suggests that courts adopt a "revised best interests"
test.329 Her test recognizes that profoundly incompetent individuals inhabit
different worlds than competent individuals, 330 but preserves their
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution.33 1  Dresser's model
depends on considering evidence from a variety of sources in order to gain
a complete idea of how the incompetent individual exists within his or her
world.3 32 In this way, the test is more inclusive than the hybrid test, which
greatly depends upon the judge's perception. 333 The revised best interests
principle involves a more impartial weighing of interests that will permit
judges to approve of new medical treatments, like the "Ashley Treatment."
Similarly, Professor Scott advocates the proposition that profoundly
incompetent individuals may not have a similar interest in procreation.334
This notion, however, is at odds with the guarantees provided in the
Constitution. 335 Scott also advances the idea that the preservation of the
family is a compelling interest that may be important to a profoundly
incompetent child.336 While this idea departs from a traditional best
interests analysis, which takes no account of how a procedure will affect the
family, Scott's family-centrism find support in current case law.3 37
Nonetheless, without adequate safeguards, courts could begin to authorize
procedures that are in the best interests of family members, but not the child
whom they are charged with protecting.338  Therefore, under current
standards, parents seeking a court order to perform the "Ashley Treatment"
will never meet the stringent burden required-foreclosing it as a viable
option. 339
327. See supra generally Part II.B.
328. See supra notes 254-74 and accompanying text.
329. See supra text accompanying note 245.
330. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Part I.A.1-3.
332. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
334. See supra text accompanying note 296.
335. See supra Part I.A.3.
336. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
337. See supra discussion accompanying notes 254-74 (discussing the court's decision in
Strunk, which recognized the importance of preserving the family sphere).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 308-12.
339. See WPAS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 17, at 15-24.
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
B. Classification and Analysis: How Courts Should Consider a Request to
Proceed with the "Ashley Treatment"
Currently, the best interests analysis is the only standard that courts can
properly apply when hearing a petition on the "Ashley Treatment." 340
Because substituted judgment requires clear and convincing evidence of a
prior preference or the establishment of an advance directive, it has no
relevance when discussing the "Ashley Treatment," which is a procedure
intended for profoundly incompetent children. 341 Therefore, courts will
weigh the pros and cons of the procedure based on the facts presented. 342
As the case law demonstrates, facts are presented in many forms depending
on who is testifying. For instance, a clinician charged with preserving the
medical health of a patient may present a different story of that patient than
a family member or nurse who sees the patient interacting on a more regular
basis. 343 How the judge chooses to weigh these conflicting stories depends
on the judge's moral perspective and what considerations he chooses to
weigh more heavily.344 The judge's morality will shape his application of
the best interests test so that he applies either a more traditional analysis
under Grady,345 a hybrid best interests analysis, or an application like
Dresser's and Scott's that incorporates many different considerations. 346 If
the judge concludes that the medical evidence is more powerful than the
extrinsic considerations, he may choose to present his conclusion by
applying a Grady analysis, which only minimally accounts for extrinsic
concerns. If, on the other hand, his inquiry reveals compelling extrinsic
concerns, the hybrid best interests application will provide a clearer
presentation of the evidence.347
This Note proposes that courts should first classify the "Ashley
Treatment" as either a reasonable or extreme treatment option based on its
potential to greatly improve the child's quality of life. The "Ashley
Treatment" is a novel medical procedure. 348 To determine whether the
"Ashley Treatment" presents a valid treatment option for a profoundly
disabled child, it must first pass constitutional muster. By nature, the
"Ashley Treatment" implicates fundamental rights that belong exclusively
to the profoundly incompetent child. 349 As a consequence, the judiciary
will police the enforcement of the "Ashley Treatment." Judicial
enforcement that is too invasive, however, may infringe upon the
340. See supra text accompanying notes 132-42.
341. See generally supra Part I.B. 1.
342. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
343. See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text (describing how the evidence in In
re Storar was contradictory).
344. See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 174-87 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part II.
347. See supra discussion accompanying notes 254-74.
348. WPAS INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 17, at 21.
349. Id. at 22; see also supra Part I.A.1-3.
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constitutionally recognized right of parents to make decisions for their
children. 350
One way that judges can reconcile the "Ashley Treatment" with existing
law is to perform an analysis that determines whether the "Ashley
Treatment" is reasonable for the particular profoundly incompetent child.
The "Ashley Treatment" by nature is an extreme request because it has the
potential to infringe upon a fundamental right or interest. However, based
on the particular facts of the case, the request could morph into one that is
reasonable. This Note argues that whether the request makes the grand leap
from extreme to reasonable is entirely fact specific. Saikewicz is a prime
example of a case in which the court sanctioned an extreme but reasonable
request. 35 1 In Saikewicz, the court permitted the cessation of chemotherapy,
an objectively extreme procedure. 352 Under the circumstances, however,
the court concluded that withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment was
appropriate and reasonable for Saikewicz. 353
The "Ashley Treatment" potentially infringes upon two fundamental
interests. First, the treatment involves invading the body of a profoundly
incompetent minor without her consent.35 4 Second, when performed on a
young girl, the treatment infringes upon that child's constitutionally
protected right to procreate.355 Society will demand that the courts ensure
that these rights are protected vigorously, and will police parental requests
that attempt to infringe upon these rights. 356 However, this Note proposes
that if requesting parents present other compelling extrinsic interests that
are more important in the particular situation than the fundamental rights
which are threatened by the proposed treatment, courts should respect and
honor those parents' requests.3 57 When courts honor this type of request,
they are indicating that the party requesting the treatment presented
sufficient factual evidence (clear and convincing) to change the extreme
request into a reasonable request. 358
Undeniably, parents who request the "Ashley Treatment" will have an
uphill struggle to present sufficiently compelling evidence. Currently,
parents must present evidence to the court that is "clear and convincing. '359
Courts should not be convinced by unsubstantiated evidence that lacks
persuasive value.360 When presented with extrinsic evidence, such as
quality of life considerations, psychological and emotional well-being, and
350. See supra Part I.A.4.
351. See supra discussion accompanying notes 200-22.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. See supra Part L.A (describing the inherent rights of profoundly incompetent children
and the constitutional right to privacy).
355. See supra Part I.A.3.
356. See supra notes 7, 15-61 and accompanying text (describing Ashley's case).
357. For a discussion of Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, which presents an
example of a court enforcing this idea, see supra Part II.A.
358. See supra text accompanying note 248.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
360. See supra text accompanying note 239.
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impact on the family structure, 361 the court should also assess whether the
parents are requesting the treatment in good faith or whether the parents are
making the request for their own benefit. To do this, courts may use the
available tools proposed by Professor Dresser. 362 This Note argues that
courts should not automatically reject a request to administer the "Ashley
Treatment" without performing an intensive factual inquiry into whether the
"Ashley Treatment" presents a legally permissible treatment option that is
in the best interests of the child.
CONCLUSION
Judge Samuel Steinfeld best articulated the inherent conflict a case like
Ashley's presents: "My sympathies and emotions are torn between a
compassion to aid an ailing young [person] and a duty to fully protect
unfortunate members of society. '363 In an ideal world, the legal standards
governing medical interventions would afford mental incompetents
infallible protection. Courts have attempted to protect the interests of
incompetent minors against involuntary sterilization by creating the
substituted judgment and best interests standards. These analyses offer
helpful guidelines, but they may be too stringent to permit the authorization
of new medical treatments that may bring certain psychological or
emotional benefits to profoundly incompetent children. While the "Ashley
Treatment" may infringe on important fundamental rights, other interests
may surface based on an intensive factual investigation 364 that are more
compelling based on the particular facts. If the parents have presented
sufficient clear and convincing evidence before a court showing that
administering the "Ashley Treatment" is more important to the child than
her fundamental interest in procreation and bodily integrity, then the request
is extreme, but nonetheless reasonable, and courts should carefully examine
whether the procedure is permissible in the particular case.
361. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417. For a discussion of In re Storar and the
psychological and physical consequences of treating Storar with a blood transfusion, see
supra notes 277-86. See also Lewis, supra note 130, at 588-94.
362. See generally supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
363. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
364. See generally supra Part II.B-C.
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